The National Transportation Safety Board posted findings on its Web site Thursday that blame Bogucki for failing to operate the equipment properly. The post also says the design of the airline’s equipment was a contributing factor.

The safety board, however, said staffing levels "had no direct bearing" on the incident. It also said that although there were fewer workers than usual that night, staffing was consistent with the company’s model.

"An accident happens, you’re there, you have some blame," said Bob Bennek , who was until this week the safety director of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Air Transport District 143 , which includes Norfolk.

"How much of the blame you put on her is what the debate is," he said. "The only blame I put on her was that she was an extremely conscientious employee because she was out there alone. I wish she would have said, 'No, I’m mad as hell and I’m waiting for help.’"

NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway said the findings are preliminary and subject to change. He said a final report will be issued in 12 to 18 months.

Wednesday October 11, 2006

Greece's Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board said yesterday that the August 2005 Helios Airlines 737-300 crash was caused primarily by the pilots' "nonrecognition" that the cabin pressurization mode selector was switched to "manual" and their subsequent misreading of warning signs.

The errors led to the flightcrew's incapacitation "due to hypoxia" when the aircraft failed to pressurize on ascent. It flew for more than 90 min. on autopilot before its fuel was exhausted and its engines flamed out. "The aircraft continued descending rapidly and impacted hilly terrain...approximately 33 km. northwest of the Athens International Airport," said the Greek government report issued yesterday. All 121 passengers and crew were killed.

The Larnaca-Athens-Prague flight was doomed by a variety of human errors, investigators concluded. The pilots were at fault for not recognizing the cabin pressurization switch's incorrect setting before takeoff and "nonidentification" of warnings once the plane was airborne. Maintenance workers were at fault for failing to return the pressurization mode selector to the "auto" position after performing nonscheduled maintenance.

The Cypriot airline, now called Ajet Airways, was plagued by "deficiencies in...quality management and safety culture." Regulators were guilty of "inadequate execution" of safety oversight. Finally, Boeing was called to task for "ineffectiveness of measures taken by the manufacturer in response to previous pressurization incidents in the particular type of aircraft."

The investigation into the crash of a Helios Airways 737 in August 2005 spurred FAA to mandate changes in procedures for pre-flight set-up of the aircraft model's cabin pressurization system to ensure crews have the settings configured properly, and that they receive sufficient alerts if the pressurization switch is set incorrectly.

Other "latent" factors cited by AAISB were operator deficiencies in quality management and safety, weak crew resource management, inadequate safety oversight by regulatory authorities and "ineffectiveness of measures" taken by the airframer in response to previous 737 pressurization incidents.

(Columbia) October 3, 2006 - A federal report says Lieutenant Governor Andre Bauer's plane had the wrong sized bolts holding some engine parts when it crashed in May in Cherokee County.

The expanded report by the National Transportation Safety Board says the plane had the wrong size bolts holding engine induction tubes.]

The report says the owners manual for a Mooney M20E aircraft, like the one Bauer was piloting, does not specify a specific distance requirement for soft field takeoffs.

Bombardier Aerospace wants to give jet operators additional safety training to counter those errors. That's why about 460 pilots and crew members from around the world are scheduled to participate in Bombardier's 10th annual Safety Standdown at the Hyatt Regency Wichita. The Standdown runs through Thursday.

Aircraft today are much more sophisticated, and pilots depend more and more on the plane's technology, said Gene Cernan, the last astronaut to walk on the moon and one of the event's hosts. But pilots must be prepared for any situation, Cernan said.

"Computers and microprocessors are only as smart as we are," he said.

At Safety Standdown, participants attend lectures and workshops on fatigue countermeasures, nutrition and psychological factors, managing the unexpected, icing, advanced aerodynamics and other topics.

They also have opportunities for hands-on training for situations they've not experienced before. They learn evacuation procedures for air and water, how to use a fire extinguisher on an in-flight fire, and CPR and defibrillator training.

Safety Standdown's "vision is to integrate knowledge-based training with skills-based training to reduce human error," said Bob Agostino, director of flight operations for Bombardier Business Aircraft.

"The industry's been good to Bombardier," Agostino said. "This is our way of saying thank you."

A Skywest regional jet departing last Saturday from LAX to San Antonio reached 100 kts before aborting takeoff, to avoid a Gulfstream business jet taxing across the active runway. The planes missed by less than 100 feet.

The near-accident occurred around 6:00 pm, when the UK-registered Gulfstream taxied from a hangar on the south side of the field and was given instructions to cross the outer runway but hold short of the inner runway, the Los Angeles Times reported.

The Gulfstream pilot told officials he was certain the controller had cleared him to cross both runways, even though he twice read back the "hold short" instructions correctly, Ian Gregor, an FAA spokesman, told the Times.

FAA officials said the SkyWest pilot, the tower controller and the ground radar that alerts controllers to impending collisions all noticed -- at the same time -- the Gulfstream crossing the runway.

"We had three layers of redundancy," continued Gregor, "This is just a clear and clean pilot mistake."

According to tapes released to the LA Times, the shaken controller called out, "SkyWest 6430, I apologize. We never talked to the Gulfstream. He crossed without a clearance. I apologize. If you could make a right turn, please, and exit the runway."

The SkyWest pilot is heard responding, "Exiting right," exhaling heavily.

Pilots familiar with LAX acknowledge it is one of most complex fields in the nation, with two sets of parallel runways flanking to the north and south the tower and terminals. Pilots landing or taking off from an outer runway must follow a complicated taxi route across the inner runway.

"You're having controllers working too long and too hard on position," said Mike Foote, a controller in the LAX tower and a spokesman for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. "This was all pilot error -- you can't say it wasn't -- but the fact is this didn't use to happen. People would catch it. We still do … but more frequently it's not being caught."

Components of a Disaster Kit

· Bottled water (4 liters/1 gallon per person per day)

· Non-perishable foods, including comfort foods such as cookies and coffee

· Clothing/bedding

· First aid kit

· Medicines and vitamins

· Flashlight and portable radio

· Batteries

· Pocketknife, manual can opener and bottle opener

· Candles

· Waterproof matches

· Duct tape

7 Steps of a Family Escape Plan